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Going out of the country has been a hot idea for many of the companies from mainland Chinese 
for the last 20 years. Decision makers believe an IPO in a more developed economy helps their 
company raise equity capital at a lower cost, therefore boosts the operating performance. However, 
many domestic researchers doubt the presumption with empirical supports, arguing that a good number 
of companies have failed to present any evident improvement but deterioration in their operating 
performance. They contend that such performance deterioration is due to Chinese decision makers 
failing to fully anticipate the effects of relatively higher expenses of being listed in a developed 
economy, that will excessively offset the benefits.  
Few studies related to the overseas-listings of Chinese firms have been done. Furthermore, 
most of these studies focus on the companies who are listed on both Hong Kong Stock Exchange and 
A-share market, known as cross-listing or dual-listing. This is due to a series of policies and programs 
that encourage Chinese companies, particularly the state-owned companies, to issue IPOs in both HK 
and the mainland by the Chinese government in the last two decades. However, I intend to employ a 
comparison between single-listed companies only, who are either listed in HK or the mainland but not 
both. I hope that the implementation of such strategy from a different perspective may complement 
other studies in the area to a degree.  
 
 
This paper compares the operating performance of mainland Chinese firms who are listed on 
HKEX with the Chinese firms who are listed in Shanghai or Shenzhen as A-shares through a 
Propensity Score Matching. This is because the results from a traditional OLS regression will be 
compromised by the problem of selection bias. PSM, however, yields to a more precise comparison 
between the two groups of firms so to leave us a relatively pure random effects to analyze. I still choose 
HKEX as the target data base since most of overseas-listing Chinese companies are clustered here – 
in terms of both dual- and single-listing. We match and compare 956 HK listed firm-years with 11,679 
A-share firm-years between 2014 and 2017, and the results show a subtle decrease in return on assets 
in the HK listed companies. This conclusion is actually consistent with most of the studies on cross-
listing Chinese companies. I also compare the ROA according to the political background of the 
sample company, that is whether the company is state-owed or not. Consequently, state-owned HK-
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The popularity of overseas-listings came as a result of the rapid globalization of capital markets 
since as early as 1970s. Stock exchanges from developed economies such as NYSE are usually the 
destination for cross-border listings due to their relatively advanced regulations, mature investment 
environments and liquid markets with larger investor bases. Such features attract a major number of 
enterprises particularly from emerging economies who wish to raise capital at a lower cost as well as 
expand their business over an international creditability. However, such advantages on developed 
markets usually come at a two main costs: additional reporting requirements, and higher listing and 
registration fees. As exciting as the idea of being listed overseas might be, it has always been a 
challenge for decision makers to consider the trade-off between the costs and the potential benefits. In 
addition, foreign companies usually find themselves facing higher initial listing requirements. For 
example, the adjusted pre-tax income of non-U.S. companies must exceed $100 million for last three 
fiscal years and $25 million for each of the two most recent years, while that of U.S. companies only 
needs to exceed $10 million for last three years and $2 million for each of the most recent years.1 
It is quite obvious that China has been among the top economies (if not the top one) in the 
world who have been contributing as much as benefitting the most from the globalization of the 
marketplace for capital in the last two decades. Such economic trend has been inevitably involving a 
nationwide rush for local companies to go public abroad since 1993. As fast as China’s economy has 
been growing, many Chinese companies decide to go abroad for equity financing, which implies a 
considerable gap between the demand and supply of capital on the equity market. Besides the rationale 
explained in the first paragraph, this may also be caused by particular local policies such as that 
companies with a foreign majority shareholder cannot be listed on either Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SSE) or Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), which was the biggest reason for Alibaba Inc., whose 
major owners back in 2007 were Softbank and Yahoo, to turn to Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX). 
The controls on foreign exchange and foreign investment activities on mainland Chinese stock market 
                                                        




have been encouraging local companies, among which, interestingly, a great number of state-owned 
enterprises, to look for alternative stock exchanges for better market liquidity. As a result of that and 
the geographical and cultural advantages, Hong Kong has been the most popular destination for 
overseas-listing for mainland Chinese companies, far followed by Singapore and U.S. On the other 
hand, a market cap of 3,936 billion USD (as of 30 November 2018, ranking 5th of the world)2, and 
well-developed economy and regulatory system certainly put HKEX up among top stock exchanges 
in the world from any aspect.  
As there are other options such as depositary receipt programs (DRs) and back door listings, 
which in fact have much longer histories, researchers nowadays appear much more interested in 
overseas IPOs, and so am I. Despite researcher’s long-lasting debate over the effects on enterprises 
brought by cross-border listings at a global scope, relatively fewer literature can be used to fully 
explain the particular case in China, who has always been considered one with very different 
characteristics than other major economies. In China, however, most of the related literature focuses 
on cross-listing enterprises, that is, companies who are listed on both of their local and an overseas 
stock exchange. The situation has been nothing but enhanced by a series of incentive programs and 
policies laid out by the Chinese government to encourage qualified companies, especially the state-
owned firms, to be listed on both HKEX and A-share market since 2000s. Yet, the fact is that the 
number of de facto mainland Chinese companies who are single-listed on a foreign exchange alone 
has long exceeded the number of the cross-listed, or dual-listing, companies. We call them de facto 
because even though many of these companies like Tencent and Alibaba have a foreign registered 
address primarily for tax purpose (with Cayman Islands being the most popular one), and often with 
nominal foreign major shareholders, all of their business operations are mainly based in mainland 
China; still they are commonly excluded from official reports since they are not technically Chinese 
enterprises. In order to land on a precise analysis on how much would overseas-listing affect a Chinese 
company’s performance than ordinary domestic listing, I believe it would be useful to focus on those 
companies who are listed either on an overseas stock exchange or A-share market, but not on both of 
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them at the same time. When it comes to the comparison between the two groups, however, a plain 
OLS may appear inappropriate due to a potential problem called “selection bias”. In other words, we 
want to make sure the random effects we end up with are the results of the action of overseas-listing 
itself, instead of any other characteristics of the overseas-listing company. To solve the problem of 
selection bias, a Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method is suitable for such situation in which we 
want to conclude random effects by matching the two groups of samples according to any possible 
characteristics other than the location, that is the counterfactual status we want to observe, of their 
listing. As a result, PSM of HKEX and A-share companies between fiscal year of 2014 and 2017 leaves 
us with a subtly negative return on assets in the HKEX listed companies, which is actually consistent 
with most of the studies on cross-listing Chinese companies. I also compare the ROA according to the 
political background of the sample company, that is whether the company is state-owed or not. 
Consequently, state-owned HK-listed companies display an even worse ROA, but with an even higher 
total assets growth rate. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the basic theories upon 
which this dissertation is built, as well as recent relevant studies in the area. I will then spend Section 
3 on the explanation of the hypotheses, as well as the data selection and the setting of the variables. 
Section 4 introduces the methodology followed by the summary of the empirical results of the PSM 
model, and a couple of tests for the validity. Finally, Section 5 concludes my study and gives a couple 
of suggestions for future works based upon the limitations of this paper. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 THEORIES 
Despite the still-ongoing debate over the effects of overseas-listing on a company, the majority 
of international researchers agree that such action usually improves the company’s performance. Their 
conclusions are generally built on a couple of basic economic concepts. First of all, a rational overseas-
listing expands a company’s investor base therefore lowers the risk premium, or required rate of return, 
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demanded by the investors. Secondly, correct positioning in multi-strata of the global capital 
marketplace helps the company maximize its expected cash-flow therefore improves further operation. 
Thirdly, a relatively developed market which provides greater protection to investors tends to bind the 
company with stricter corporate governance, and empirical studies show that enterprises with better 
corporate governance elements such as accounting responsibility and operation transparency usually 
will be better off in a medium to long term. Last but not least, most of the corporate securities on open 
capital markets like the U.S. tend to enjoy better liquidity. Many Chinese domestic studies, however, 
conclude that being listed abroad does not necessarily improve mainland Chinese companies in terms 
of operating performance because many decision makers follow the hot sound of the idea like sheep 
without rational analysis on the costs and benefits of an overseas IPO. 
These concepts are based upon the following theories and hypotheses: 
2.1.1. Market Segmentation Theory 
When the capital market of an economy is isolated from the international capital market, as “is 
segmented”, the risk of capital investments is limited onto the shoulders of domestic investors, who 
as a result expect higher risk premia. Errunza and Losq (1985) demonstrated the concept with a rather 
“mild-segmented” case but landed on a significant conclusion: higher degree of segmentation between 
less developed economics and U.S. than that between Europe and U.S. leads to a directly proportional 
price difference of assets. In other words, if country A (more segmented) can buy securities from 
country B (open market) but country B cannot buy securities from country A, the price of country B’s 
securities will be closer to a global market price than that of country A’s. For an enterprise from a 
relatively segmented economy, overseas-listing is an opportunity to cut cost of capital as larger 
investor base implies lower risk premium. 
2.1.2. Liquidity Hypothesis 
Supporters of Liquidity Hypothesis believe that higher liquidity will lead to a lower risk 
premium and therefore lower cost of capital. Therefore, higher liquidity is considered one of the key 
factors driving enterprises to turn to a developed, well-organized and international stock market. 
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Amihud and Mendelson’s (1986) model points to a causal relationship between the pricing of an asset 
and its illiquidity, which is defined as the cost of immediate execution of a transaction and measured 
by the asset’s bid-ask spread on market,: investors look forward to a higher required rate of return at 
an asset with lower liquidity and vice versa. When a company can be traded on a more liquid stock 
market, its financing cost decreases as investors’ liquidity risk does.  
2.1.3. Bonding Hypothesis 
Some researchers believe that a developed market mechanism itself protect the interests of 
investors by restraining managers and large shareholders, others think managers and large 
shareholders are only restrained when the market mechanism is backed up by regulations and laws. 
This hypothesis is highlighted by Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999) while studying cross-listing 
from the aspect of corporate governance. They think foreign companies from economies with 
relatively weak legal environments commit (bond) themselves to provide investors with better 
shareholder protections under stricter regulations when they come to a more developed capital market. 
As a response, the confidence of investors from the developed market is usually appropriate, which is 
one of the decisive factors for a relatively efficient market in terms of costs of capital. 
2.1.4. Capital Structure Theory 
Since 1958 brought up by Modigliani and Miller (1958), researchers all over the world have 
never stopped working on the improvement in the theory of capital structure. MM models contend that 
a company’s capital structure has nothing to do with its valuation under ideal circumstances. 
Successors then started to loosen up the circumstances by adding corporate tax and bankruptcy costs. 
In addition, A couple of subsequent theories are built upon MM models with an extra condition – 
asymmetric information, including the signaling theory, the pecking order theory and the agency costs 
theory. Hirota (1999) and Booth et al. (2001) point out that due to the limitations of financing channels 
in less developed economies, the enterprises often end up with an unduly high debt ratio, which is 
considered a potential risk to a company’s operation. It is especially the case in mainland China where 
there’s state-owned enterprises which have better access to banks, which are also mainly state-owned, 
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for debt financing, driving a number of private companies to look for equity financing opportunities 
abroad. 
2.2 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Under this section, I will start with an overview of past remarkable works on motives for 
companies going public on a foreign stock exchange. Then I will briefly discuss past studies on the 
effects of overseas-listing on companies’ performance, which is a rich area at the global scope. It’s a 
reminder, however, that the majority of the past works regarding the topic focus on cross-listing 
enterprises, that is companies listed on both a domestic (usually less developed economy) and a foreign 
(usually more developed economy) stock exchanges. The study on single-listed only companies may 
be a substantially different case, whereas I still find enormous values from these papers for the building 
of our own methodology and models. The review includes works from both international and Chinese 
domestic researchers. 
2.2.1 Studies on Motives for Overseas-Listing 
Most of researchers focus on three motives that believed to be the mainly reasons for overseas-
listing: financial, corporate governance and marketing strategy. 
(1) Financial Motivation 
Major studies on the financial motivation for going public on foreign markets are done by the 
U.S. researchers. Lins, Strickland and Zenner (2005) show with empirical proof that companies with 
promising prospects tend to be willing to be listed in developed economies for a lower cost of capital. 
Jia, Sun and Tong (2005) study on a data sample of mainland Chinese firms listed on HKEX from 
1993 to 2002 and come to a conclusion stating overseas IPOs are practically contributing to the order 
of domestic security market (SSE and SZSE) by helping ease off the pressure from excessive demand 
for equity financing, which is quite common under a relatively immature capital environment like 
China. Jiang (2008) compares totally over 1000 companies from A-share market as well as foreign 
markets and empirical results reveal obvious financing efficiency at lower costs in developed countries. 
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He attributes the results to stricter regulatory environments and deeper information disclosure. Chen 
and Wang (2007), from a different point of view, indirectly conclude that overseas-listing can 
effectively lower a company’s financing demand by proving a systematical decrease in sensitivity to 
free cash-free after cross-listing on HKEX with double-listing Chinese companies’ data from 2000 to 
2003. 
(2) Corporate Governance Motivation 
The mechanism of the corporate governance motivation for foreign listing has been explained 
to the essence by Coffee’s (1999, 2002) bonding hypothesis as covered in earlier section. To simply 
put, companies who believe that benefits brought by confident investors will beat the costs of higher 
corporate governance standards tend to go public on developed stock market, where investors’ 
confidence are usually guaranteed by strict corporate governance. In the same year, La Porta et al. 
(1999) interpret the same mechanism from a rather systematical perspective: the better protection a 
market provides with its investors, the easier it is for a company to finance externally, and vice versa. 
We thus expect more companies with confidence in their corporate governance and profitable projects 
desperate to get into stock exchanges such as NYSE and NASDAQ. Blass and Yafeh (2001) compare 
Israeli companies listed in USA and Israel and find young and ambitious companies appear more 
willingly to commit to better corporate integrity for more cash in the USA. 
(3) Strategic Motivation 
Since the end of the last century, researchers and decision makers have realized that overseas-
listing usually comes up with an advertising effect, contributing to an increase in global sales. Das and 
Saudagaran (1998) analyze 451 non-U.S. enterprises and observed an intention of expanding market 
shares over a global awareness through cross-listing in the U.S. Bancel and Mittoo (2002) employed 
a survey and the result shows a majority of managers of 305 companies from 6 European countries 
believe overseas-listing brings an international fame while some of them see the action as a marketing 
strategy instead of a financing option.  
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2.2.2 Studies on Effects of Overseas-Listing on Enterprise’ Performance 
The effects on companies’ performance by cross-border listing have been a long and still 
ongoing debate, and researchers have done tons of empirical analyses from different perspectives. 
However, there still hasn’t been a particular model(s) that can conclude such topic in a systematical 
sense which can comprehensively reflects the company’s characteristics such as geography and 
industry. Although fewer studies have done by Chinese researchers and on Chinese enterprises, most 
of them conclude negative effects on overseas-listing of Chinese companies. 
(1) Positive Effects 
Empirical analysis done by Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) based on 715 companies from 
40 countries cross-listed in the U.S. and 4080 stayed-home companies has been considered a milestone 
on the topic in terms of the U.S. stock market, cited by numerous successors. Their results reveal an 
average of 16.5% higher Tobin’s q ratios of cross-listed companies than that of the stayed-home firms, 
leading to a statistically significant valuation difference of 37%. Doidge et al. attribute the higher 
valuation to better growth opportunities due to the less extent to which controlling shareholders can 
engage in expropriation. Khurana et al. (2007) find “a positive association between cross-listing and 
subsequent externally financed firm growth rates,” using a sample of firms from 37 countries that are 
cross-listed in the U.S., even though they fail to find a function that can systematically summarize the 
variance of increases in externally financed firm growth after cross-listing and their home-country 
attributes. Ting Yang’s (2002) evidence also displays a higher performance on cross-listed Japanese 
companies than non-cross-listed ones.  
In China, Kong and Li (2010) state that a more transparent capital market will put a heavier 
cost on a company but also will boost its growth rate and operating performance after analyzing 
Chinese companies cross-listed in the U.S. 
(2) Neutral and Negative Effects 
Sarkissian and Schill’s (2004) global data sample of 1676, from 25 countries, shows a rather 
transitory nature of valuation gains to overseas-listing instead of a permanent one. Furthermore, they 
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“find little evidence of a permanent effect on returns for firms that list abroad, even for firms' listings 
in markets that are more liquid, provide better legal protection, or have a larger shareholder base,” 
such as the U.S. Some researchers, however, examine the effects of cross-listing under specific 
conditions and factors. Foerster and Karolyi (1993) pick the case of two “similar” economies – the 
U.S. and Canada – to test “weather the extent of economic and financial market integration (or 
segmentation) between a firm's home country and listing country influences stock price reaction.” 
They end up with an average rise of 9.4% in risk-adjusted stock prices of cross-listed Canadian firms 
during the 100 days before the week of listing, followed by an additional 2% rise around the cross-
listing date, but eventually land on a corresponding drop of 9.7% in the 100 days after the cross-listing. 
However, they find a subsample of Canadian resource firms does not exhibit these stock price effects, 
suggesting industry-related factors may be among the important determinants of market integration. 
Karolyi (1998), quoting several sources, reports a risk-adjusted decline in stock’s value of 12%–19% 
in the year following cross-listing.  
Pan and Dai (2008) use ROA, ROE and EVA as KPI to measure the performance mainland 
Chinese companies cross-listed on HKEX and come up with some good numbers for companies 
performance one year before cross-listing but considerable decreases in the three years after cross-
listing. They believe the phenomenon is caused by company’s inappropriate operations on the newly 
raised capital, despite an evidence of insensitivity to cashflow after the event. Pan’s (2007) other paper 
employs a regression methodology on performance of the mainland Chinese companies who go public 
on HKEX before they cross-list on A-share board in SSE or SZSE then results show a general sharp 
fall after cross-listing. Kong, Shao and Ren (2014) compare the mechanism of the second board on 
both A-share and Nasdaq and contend that: (1) the more hungers a medium-size company for cash the 
more likely it will choose to go abroad; and (2) ownership concentration has a strong relationship with 
the company’s performance, this is particularly the case for medium-sized firms and IT businesses. 
 
3. HYPOTHESES, DATA AND VARIABLES 
 
10 
3.1. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
The very first overseas-listing of a Chinese company happened in the year of 1993, when 
Tsingtao Brewery Co. went on public in Shanghai and Hong Kong at the same time. Over the next 
twenty years, the government has published a series of regulations and policies to encourage domestic 
companies who are traded on A-share market to dig out more money by issuing securities in developed 
economies, especially HK. According to Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China, any direct 
or indirect (ADRs) cross-listings have to be implemented with the approval from China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC).3 However, since foreign registered firms are not allowed to be listed 
on A-share market, many de factor Chinese companies have quite often been omitted from relevant 
studies and analyses. This paper defines a Chinese company as an enterprise which is either registered 
in the mainland China or incorporated outside but headquartered and operating a majority of its 
business in the mainland China. Also, some foreign companies choose to be traded in the U.S. through 
DR programs due to their features of fast procedures and lower costs. Yet, most of Chinese companies 
still choose IPOs for overseas-listing. 
The main purpose of the study demonstrated by this paper is to examine whether the action of 
overseas-listing done by a Chinese firm would have any effects on the firm’s operating performance. 
Therefore, the first hypothesis would be set up straightforward. 
Hypothesis 1: The corporate performance of a Chinese company listed on a market of more 
developed economy is different from that of a Chinese company listed on the domestic market. 
Interestingly, one feature differentiates the Chinese corporate landscape from other major 
economies in the world is a considerable composition of state-owned enterprises. Zhang et al. (2011) 
analyze the political relations as well as financing and investment behaviors of Chinese public 
companies and the empirical results reflect a positive relationship between the company’s political 
influence and resources of capital. We thus add one more hypothesis to our study. 
Hypothesis 2: The corporate performance of a state-owned Chinese enterprise improves better 
                                                        
3 CSRC (http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/shenzhen/xxfw/tzzsyd/ssgs/zh/zhxx/201504/t20150430_275948.htm) 
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after overseas-listing than a non-state-owned Chinese enterprise does. 
3.2. DATA 
I choose Hong Kong Stock Exchange as the data base for overseas-listing Chinese companies 
since it has been the most popular destination far better than the second – the U.S. Another advantage 
that can be exploited for the study from it is the lack of a cultural barrier between the mainland and 
Hong Kong, which is considered to be helpful in controlling the characteristics of the two markets in 
order to reach a precise comparison. I only select the companies who are single listed, that is, either 
listed on HKEX or A-share market (SSE or SZSE) but not both at the same time (known as the AH 
firms). The rationale behind this scheme is to extract Chinese companies’ IPOs on HKEX and domestic 
IPOs as a quasi-counterfactual, since the real counterfactual is impossible to observe.  
The sample pool of this paper comes from China Stock Market Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) between the fiscal year of 2014-2017 (some of the firms end on March 31, 2018), 
complemented by Bloomberg and HKEX database. All of the companies have gone public through an 
IPO. The tricky part during the data collection is the identification of the de facto Chinese companies 
incorporated overseas. This problem only happens to the enterprises listed on HKEX as the Chinese 
A-share market does not admit foreign registered companies. As a solution we only include companies 
who satisfy both of the two conditions: (1) headquartered in mainland China; (2) more than 50% of 
operating income comes from mainland China. Financial firms are excluded as they usually have a 
very different capital structure than other industries, as well as insolvent firms with a debt ratio greater 
than 100% because they are extremely unlikely to be able to repay their debts anymore. We also want 
to kick out A-share companies who are marked with “ST” or “PT” which indicates a suspension or 
restriction on the company’s trade due to a significant underperformance for three consecutive years, 
or a series of unusual operations implying suspicious activities from the controlling shareholder. In 
addition, observations with missing data for the variables needed for the model (will be explained 
later) are taken out of the sample pool. The final sample pool ends up with 12635 firm-year 
observations (out of roughly 18000 before the application of screening conditions) in total, classified 
 
12 
into ten sectors according to Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) as energy, materials, 
industrials, consumer discretionary, consumer staples, health care, financials, IT, communication 
services, utilities and real estate. Finally, we winsorize all numbers with replacement at the upper and 
lower 1 percentiles to mitigate the effect of extreme outliers and eradicate errors in the data. 
3.3. VARIABLES 
This paper uses ROA based on a company’s fiscal year financial reports to measure its 
operating performance as it is one of the most explanatory and widely used financial ratios when 
comparing similar enterprises. I decide not to use ROE because of the reason that companies listed on 
different markets may have distinct capital structures so that likely to yield an unconvincing result. 
We use the annual growth rate of total assets as a secondary indicator to measure the effectiveness of 
overseas-listing as the logic that lower the costs of capital, the more cash an overseas-listing company 
is likely to raise, so that it will have a better chance to expand the size of business. A third financial 
used in this paper in terms of performance measurement would be Tobin’s Q. A company with a Q 
ratio higher than one is earning a rate higher than its replacement cost. However, Tobin’s Q has 
particular limitations in Chinese stock market: first, as Chinese stock market as a whole appears to be 
more volatile, it is difficult to separate the performance of firms from that of the market; second, many 
A-share companies tend to have more amount of uncirculated shares held by founders and other 
insiders, which as a result significantly compromises the accuracy of the Q ratio’s calculation. In this 
paper, market prices are used during the calculation of the market values for uncirculated shares. 
A list of control variables (aka, matching variables) are used to match observations from two 
groups of companies in order to extract random effects caused by the fact of overseas-listing. Key 
variables include natural logarithm of total assets, debt ratio, total assets turnover, fixed assets ratio, 
profit margin, whether or not state-owned enterprise, etc. A list of the definition and construction of 





Table 1 Summary Statistics of Variables for Chinese Companies Listed Overseas (HK = 1) 




ROA 956 0.041 0.067 -0.142 0.253 
GROWTH 956 0.191 0.380 -0.270 2.193 
SIZE 956 22.588 1.894 19.251 25.700 
TOBINQ 956 1.396 2.635 0.698 15.406 
LEVER 956 0.488 0.222 0.058 0.886 
EM 956 2.850 1.836 1.062 8.928 
TOP1 956 0.497 0.164 0.098 0.790 
TANG 956 0.250 0.212 0.002 0.724 
PROFM 956 0.081 0.183 -0.598 0.520 
LIQUID 956 2.357 2.455 0.298 14.865 
ASTURN 956 0.670 0.557 0.0634 2.532 
SOE 956 0.571 0.495 0 1 
 
Table 2 Summary Statistics of Variables for A-share Companies (HK = 0) 




ROA 11,679 0.055 0.060 -0.142 0.253 
GROWTH 11,679 0.231 0.369 -0.270 2.193 
SIZE 11,679 21.842 1.242 19.251 25.70 
TOBINQ 11,679 3.054 2.681 0.698 15.406 
LEVER 11,679 0.410 0.201 0.058 0.886 
EM 11,679 2.039 1.211 1.062 8.928 
TOP1 11,679 0.361 0.155 0.098 0.790 
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TANG 11,679 0.210 0.159 0.002 0.724 
PROFM 11,679 0.092 0.135 -0.598 0.520 
LIQUID 11,679 2.482 2.308 0.298 14.865 
ASTURN 11,679 0.660 0.432 0.063 2.532 
SOE 11,679 0.293 0.455 0 1 
 
 We can group our sample pool into two according to the location of their stock exchange 
and summarize with a dummy variable called “HK”. The HK will be equal to 1 if the company is listed 
on HKEX and 0 otherwise. From the summary statistics of the two groups, we actually find rather 
similar average numbers for most of the variables. The eye-catcher is that the proportion of state-
owned enterprises (SOE) of HKEX listed companies are almost twice that of the ones stayed home. 
Companies listed on HKEX also appear to be generally bigger in terms of total assets. This implies a 
potential self-selection bias that bigger and/or state-owned companies tend go abroad as they are 
relatively easier to be approved by the regulators to go outside as well as more confident than smaller-
sized firms, which is the main reason that we need to “match” the companies from the two groups to 
reach a more accurate comparison, instead of using traditional OLS method. On the other hand, higher 
TOP1 of overseas-listed firms is also likely attributed to the greater proportion of state-owned 
companies since they are usually highly concentrated in terms of ownership. The ROA and assets 
growth rate of A-share companies are slightly higher, while the Tobin’s Q is a lot higher. This recalls 
the potential problem we discussed above: the mainland Chinese stock market is likely being 
overvalued if we calculate the values of all uncirculated shares at their market prices. Debt ratios of 
HKEX companies appear to be higher, possibly due to larger companies tend to have more access to 
debts from banks according to Zhang et al. (2011). Please note that the maximum and minimum 
numbers of each variable for the two groups are the same because we have winsorized the entire 





4. METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1. PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING 
4.1.1. Introduction 
In a general sense, effects of a specific action or event can usually be concluded by the 
difference between the status under the fact and the status under the counterfactual. However, for most 
of the cases in real life, any object is nearly impossible to be observed under two statuses at one 
particular moment. Experimental studies can build a counterfactual status through the setup of a 
treatment group and control group of the objects. Empirical studies, however, need to find other ways 
to mitigate the possibility of selection bias to the minimum. Propensity score matching is one of the 
methods. 
The idea of propensity score is developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Their method 
involves a way of selecting samples for a control group based on the values of one or more specific 
variables, such that the nature, other than the status we want to study, of the control group would as 
close to that of the treated group as possible. The score, therefore, is the metrics for the “closeness” of 
the two groups. In our case, the treatment group is the overseas-listed companies and the control group 
is the domestic-listed companies, and the status we want to study if the action of being listed overseas. 
4.1.2. Propensity Score 
According to Rosenbaum and Rubin, the propensity score (PS) is defined as “the conditional 
probability of receiving a treatment given pre-treatment characteristics.”  
P(X) = Pr [D =1 | X] = E [D | X]    (1)  
In equation (1), D works as a binary indicator variable which equals to 1 if a firm implements 
an overseas IPO and 0 otherwise. X is the multidimensional vector of control variables upon which 
we create the control group. Therefore, if we can estimate the propensity score for the ith company, 
we can then end up with an average difference of the effects on the treated group and the control group, 
known as the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT): 
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     ATT = E(Y1i -Y0i | Di = 1) 
   = E{E[Y1i -Y0i | Di = 1, P(Xi)]} 
   = E{E[Y1i | Di = 1, P(Xi)] - E[Y0i | Di = 0, P(Xi)] | Di = 1}    (2) 
In equation (2), Y1i and Y0i represent the estimated outcomes of the companies listed on HKEX 
and the A-class companies respectively.  
In practice, the estimation of propensity scores is usually done through a Logit or Probit models, 
which are designed for estimating probabilities on binary outcomes. Such method is established by 
Dehejia and Wahba (2002). This paper uses a Logit model: 
P(Xi)  = Pr(Di = 1 | Xi) = 
𝑒𝑥𝑝(βXi)
1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝(βXi)
    (3) 
where exp(βXi) / 1+ exp(βXi) is the cumulative distribution function outputting the probability result. 
X is the multidimensional vector of independent variables which may affect the likelihood, known as 
the so-called propensity, of companies to implement overseas-listing, and β is a coefficients vector. 
4.1.3. Matching Methods 
P(Xi) is a continuous variable therefore makes it impossible to land on a perfect matching pair 
of companies who have the exact same propensity scores. However, researchers have come up with 
various solutions to solve this question. Thanks to Becker and Ichino’s (2002) summarization, we now 
know three of the most widely used matching methods are Nearest-Neighbor Matching, Radius 
Matching and Kernel Matching. 
As the name suggests, the idea of nearest neighbor matching is to match a treated sample with 
a control sample such that the two propensity scores yield the smallest absolute value of difference, 
that is the nearest distance. Denote C(i) the set of control companies that matched to the ith company 
from the treated group with an estimated propensity score of Pi with a propensity score of Pj, so that: 
C(i) = min || Pi – Pj ||    (4) 
Radius matching, instead of finding the closest match, includes all of control companies with 
estimated propensity scores falling within a distance radius r: 
C(i) = {Pi | || Pi – Pj || < r}    (5) 
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If an overseas-listed company i, where i ∈ T, has 𝑁𝑖
𝐶 non-overseas-listed matches, Wij = 1 / 
𝑁𝑖
𝐶 stands for the weight for ever jth non-overseas-listed company (j ∈ C(i)), otherwise Wij = 0. Then 
for a treated group with 𝑁𝑇 companies, the ATT can be estimated as: 










𝑗 ∈ C     (6) 
In equation (6), M indicates either nearest-neighbor matching or radius matching and the 
weights 𝑊𝑗 = ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗. Furthermore, if the weights are fixed and the outcomes of effects on companies’ 
performance are independent from each other, the variances of 𝜏𝑀 can be calculated as: 









𝑗 ∈ C 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑌𝑖
𝐶)    (7) 
The Kernel matching involves a more complicated concept. Simply put, by implementing the 
kernel matching we match every ith treated company with all control companies, but at a weight that 
is inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity scores of the treated company and the 
jth control company. Then the ATT can be estimated as: 
𝜏𝐾  =  
1
𝑁𝑇
∑ {𝑖 ∈ 𝑇 𝑌𝑖
𝑇  −  
∑ 𝑌𝑗
𝐶𝐺((𝑝𝑗 − 𝑝𝑖) / ℎ𝑛)𝑗 ∈ C
∑ 𝐺((𝑝𝑘 − 𝑝𝑖) / ℎ𝑛)𝑘 ∈ C
    (8) 
where “G(⋅) represents the Gaussian kernel function, and  ℎ𝑛 represents bandwidth parameter. Under 
standard conditions on the bandwidth and kernel, 
∑ 𝑌𝑗
𝐶𝐺((𝑝𝑗  −  𝑝𝑖) / ℎ𝑛)𝑗 ∈ C
∑ 𝐺((𝑝𝑘  −  𝑝𝑖) / ℎ𝑛)𝑘 ∈ C
 
is a consistent estimator of the counterfactual outcome Y0i.” 
4.1.4. Summary 
Our study in this paper will employ the nearest-neighbor matching and the kernel matching to 
estimate the weighted average difference between the effects on the performance of the companies 
from the two groups. We will then test the validity of our matching through two methods: common 
support / overlap test, and covariates balance test. 
Our final task would be a weighted linear regression based on the  
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Yi = β0 +β1iHKi +β2iXi 
Where Yi stands for the ROA of the ith company as the explained variable; HK is the dummy 
variable indicating whether the ith company is listed on HKEX or not; Xi represents the vector of 
explanatory variables. 
4.2. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.2.1. Control Covariates and Logit Model 
The selection of control covariates for our Logit regression model based on previous studies 
as well as relevant economic theories. The set of our covariates is designed to analyze the effects of 
overseas-listing on a firm’s corporate performance from different perspectives. The total assets and 
net fixed assets ratio tell us the size of the firm as well as the nature of its business. For example, 
companies in the tertiary sector or IT industry tend to have low fixed assets ratio but rather higher 
intangible assets. The current and debt ratios, along with the equity multiplier, reflect its capital 
structure. Moreover, the profit margin and total assets turnover display the company’s profitability and 
efficiency. An intense proportion of the largest ownership may imply a potential problem on corporate 
governance while a state-owned firm is usually exposed to even greater risk regarding that in the 
mainland China. Tobin’s Q, when works as a control variable, measures the growth potential. In 
addition to the explanatory covariates, we also include 3 dummy variables for the time horizon and 9 
dummy variables to control the ten sectors according to GICS. 
We start with a backward stepwise regression to screen out the variables that are not significant 
towards the Logit model for PSM. The first step shows that the total assets turnover appears to be an 
unconvincing factor in deciding the probability of a mainland Chinese company going public in 
foreign countries. A detailed process for the backward stepwise Logit regression is presented in the 
Appendix (B1-2). 
We then take a look at the correlation between the variables. The results attached to the 
Appendix (C) suggest that the debt ratios are highly correlated with the equity multipliers. This is 
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likely because both of the two variables are defined as the indicator of a company’s capital structure. 
The debt ratios also show a remarkable correlation with the current ratios. I decide to keep the debt 
ratio and current ratio, but exclude the equity multiplier such it only reflects much limited information. 
 
Table 3 The Estimation Results of Logit Model (HK) 
 
 
Table 3 presents the estimated results of our logistic regression model for the future PSM. Note 
that companies from particular industry sectors are apparently more inclined to be listed overseas than 
others. A pseudo R-squared of 0.1928 reports in rather moderate effectiveness of our Logit model. A 
more important metrics, however, that evaluates the performance of a binary outcomes regression 
model is the area under a Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve, as one of 0.8154 illustrated 
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by our Fig1. The closer to 1 the area, the better the Logit model is at predicting 0s as 0s and 1s as 1s.4 
Together the two diagnostic proxies suggest that our Logit model is a healthy one. 
 
Fig. 1 Area Under the ROC curve 
 
 
4.2.2 Matching Test 
(1) Common Support / Overlap Test 
Fig. 2 compares the kernel density of propensity scores from both the treated companies and 
control companies before and after the matching. (a) shows a substantial difference between the 
distribution of PS of the two groups, indicating their significantly different characteristics on general 
average, which is why a matching is needed. (b) thereafter shows a wide common area overlapped by 
the two groups’ kernel density functions after implementation of the matching. In other words, we now 
compare two groups of firms who share much similar characteristics. 
 
 
                                                        
4 Fawcett (2006) demonstrated a comprehensive use of ROC analysis. 
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Fig. 2 Kernel Density of the Propensity Score  
 
(a) Before Matching 
 
(b) After Matching 
 
(2) Covariates Balance Test 
In a more straightforward sense, the validity and effectiveness of a PSM process are based on  
the extent to which the differences of the characteristics in interest, that is the control variables, are 
decreased to a minimum level, and as a result so is that of the bias. A matching is proved to be 
successful if the process to a significant degree reduces the absolute average value of the proportions 
of standardized bias across covariates: the closer they are to zero, the better the matching is. In our 
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case, all covariates have been improved to a large scale as shown in our Fig. 3 except for the current 
ratio, which is still healthy as the post-matching absolute value is smaller than 10. Thus, our matching 
is considered successful. A table of bias reduction in detailed numbers is provided in Appendix D. 
 
Fig. 3 Covariates Balance Test 
 
 
4.2.3 ATT Results 
 
Table 4 Results from Nearest-Neighbor Matching 
Variable Sample Treated Controls ATT t-value 
ROA Pre-Matching 0.04065 0.05516 -0.01451 -7.07*** 
 Post-Matching 0.04065 0.05121 -0.01056 -3.59*** 
      
GROWTH Pre-Matching 0.19123 0.23125 -0.04003 -3.22*** 
 Post-Matching 0.19123 0.15418 0.03704 2.30** 
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TOBINQ Pre-Matching 1.39614 3.05395 -1.65781 -18.41*** 
 Post-Matching 1.39614 1.69385 -0.29771 -2.70*** 
Note: (1) “Pre-matching” refers to the sample without matching the Treated companies with the 
 Controls, and “Post-matching” refers the groups after matching. 
     (2) “Treated” and “Controls” respectively refer to firms listed on HKEX and A-share market. 
     (3) ***, ** and * represents significance at level of 1%, 5% and %10 respectively 
 
Table 5 Results from Kernel Matching 
Variable Sample Treated Controls ATT t-value 
ROA Pre-Matching 0.04065 0.05516 -0.01451 -7.07*** 
 Post-Matching 0.04101 0.05238 -0.01137 -4.42*** 
      
GROWTH Pre-Matching 0.19123 0.23125 -0.04003 -3.22*** 
 Post-Matching 0.19237 0.15635 0.03602 2.40** 
      
TOBINQ Pre-Matching 1.39614 3.05395 -1.65781 -18.41*** 
 Post-Matching 1.39947 1.69185 -0.29238 -2.77*** 
***, ** and * represents significance at level of 1%, 5% and %10 respectively 
 
4 of the 956 treated firm-years are unable to find a match Control under kernel matching, while 
all of them are successful matched under nearest-neighbor matching (Appendix E1-2). As fairly 
consistent results from the two matching approaches present us significant effects on companies’ 
corporate performance after an IPO issuance on HKEX, we can conclude the first hypothesis by stating, 
with a minimum worry about selection bias, that an overseas-listing on an more developed market 
does have significantly different effects on a Chinese firm’s performance than listing on the A-share 
market. The decreases in both ROA and Tobin’s Q (of 0.01137 and 0.29238 respectively) are possibly 
due to the lower (post-matching) profit margin as shown in Appendix D. One of the reasons for this 
might be the higher costs of corporate governance, audit and/or listing on HKEX. The difference in 
Tobin’s Q may also suggest an overall overvaluation for the A-share market. However, an increase in 
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assets growth rate (0.03602) is reported by the PSM, implying the company’s ability of raising more 
money at a lower cost abroad. On the other hand, both of the three variables from pre-matching sample 
pool report worse results than post-matching, due to the effect of selection bias. 
4.2.4. State-Owned Enterprises 
Many Chinese state-owned companies have very different characteristics in terms of 
management, corporate governance, capital structure and operating environments than private 
companies. In additional, the dummy variable of state-owned enterprise works as a significant factor  
in deciding an overseas-listing action. Therefore, we take a closer look at the post-matching results 
under the two types of enterprises and see if different conclusions can be drawn from their post-listing 
performance.  
 
Table 6 Panel Results of State-owned and Non-state-owned Enterprises 
 All Samples SOE Non-SOE 
Variable ATT t-value ATT t-value ATT t-value 
Nearest-Neighbor Matching 
ROA -0.01056 -3.59*** -0.02661 -5.79*** -0.01095 -2.41** 
GROWTH 0.03704 2.30** 0.05666 2.40** 0.00470 0.19 
TOBINQ -0.29771 -2.70*** -0.37647 -2.09** -.02320 -0.14 
 
Kernel Matching 
ROA -0.01137 -4.42*** -0.02859 -7.29*** -0.00807 -1.94* 
GROWTH 0.03602 2.40** 0.05635 2.63*** 0.00677 0.30 
TOBINQ -0.29238 -2.77*** -0.16513 -1.06 -0.35635 -2.18** 
***, ** and * represents significance at level of 1%, 5% and %10 respectively 
 
The panel of Table 6 presents the ATT results for both of the two types of companies according 
to the matching approaches. State-owned companies appear to have more intense effects than all 
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samples average and private companies with strong significance under both matching approaches 
except kernel matching Tobin’s Q. Better assets growth rate agrees with the hypothesis that companies 
with political influence tend to have better opportunities to overseas funds access under a variety of 
encouraging programs and policies by the governance. However, worse ROAs suggest absence of 
reasonable decisions regarding the action compared to private companies. We thus can conclude our 
second hypothesis with rejection: state-owned Chinese firms do not display better corporate 
performance through overseas-listing than private Chinese firms. The results of private companies, on 
the other hand, appear to be relatively less significant. 
4.2.5. Post-Matching Linear Regression 
 
Table 7 Weighted Linear Regression on ROA 
ROA 
 Pre-Matching Post-Matching 
 Coef. t Coef. t 
HK -0.0079125 -4.86*** -0.0080514 -4.58** 
SIZE -0.0066204 -17.00*** -0.0070967 -8.94** 
LEVER -0.0227884 -7.88*** -0.0178075 -2.7** 
TOBINQ -0.0015182 -7.51*** -0.0007769 -1.41 
TOP1 0.0523125 22.00*** 0.0366275 6.76*** 
LIQUID -0.0013076 -5.16*** -0.0020288 -3.51*** 
TANG -0.0257652 -10.01*** -0.0347076 -6.09*** 
PROFM 0.3028508 67.39*** 0.2710345 31.22*** 
SOE -0.0112223 -14.72*** -0.0126912 -6.23*** 
year_2 -0.0009822 -0.95 0.00002 0.01 
year_3 -0.00161 -1.62 -0.0053149 -1.87** 
year_4 -0.0042161 -4.27*** -0.0113755 -3.92*** 
ind1 0.0057904 2.60*** 0.0032436 0.71 
ind2 0.0078568 2.94*** 0.014594 2.58** 
ind3 -0.0098271 -3.21*** -0.0179714 -2.3** 
ind4 0.0108399 4.61*** 0.0074822 1.63 
ind5 -0.0042448 -2.01** -0.008846 -2.28** 
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ind6 0.0033206 1.51 -0.0006531 -0.16 
ind7 0.0007357 0.33 -0.0070552 -1.6 
ind8 -0.0248843 -9.16*** -0.025913 -5.33*** 
ind9 -0.0078382 -2.93*** -0.0076621 -1.7* 
_cons 0.1803884 20.71*** 0.2088635 12.19*** 
N 12,635 2,766 
***, ** and * represents significance at level of 1%, 5% and %10 respectively 
 
We now implement a weighted linear regression on ROA with covariates we have used for 
PSM. The weights of samples in the post-matching regression are set according to the numbers of 
matchings they have involved during our PSM process. We can see from Table 7 that, despite the 
slightness of the difference, Pre-Matching model underestimates the degree of HK’s negative effect 
on the company’s ROA. 
 
Table 8 Weighted Linear Regression on Assets Growth Rate 
GROWTH 
 Pre-Matching Post-Matching 
 Coef. t Coef. t 
HK 0.038217 2.99*** 0.0474068 3.4*** 
SIZE 0.0218897 7.35*** 0.0009445 0.14 
LEVER 0.1127669 3.77*** 0.1487588 2.34** 
TOBINQ 0.0188834 11.2*** 0.0273448 4.48*** 
TOP1 -0.0680469 -3.57*** -0.0833254 -2.05** 
LIQUID 0.0007185 0.27 0.0063234 1.23 
TANG -0.4124345 -19.21*** -0.2404216 -5.28*** 
PROFM 0.5608679 19.24*** 0.4293091 6.54*** 
SOE -0.1228036 -19.29*** -0.0764882 -4.64*** 
year_2 0.0150662 1.76* -0.0144408 -0.66 
year_3 0.0264101 3.19*** -0.0014656 -0.07 
year_4 0.0324898 3.96*** 0.0415577 1.98** 
ind1 -0.0645822 -2.69*** -0.0109405 -0.38 
ind2 -0.083818 -3.36*** 0.006458 0.17 
ind3 -0.0747715 -2.64*** -0.0310371 -0.79 
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ind4 -0.0587527 -2.3** 0.0364557 0.91 
ind5 -0.0719484 -3.07*** -0.0147268 -0.54 
ind6 -0.0241218 -0.98 -0.0137051 -0.42 
ind7 -0.0564432 -2.38** -0.0043471 -0.13 
ind8 -0.1961536 -7.31*** -0.021038 -0.57 
ind9 -0.0083406 -0.3 0.0676205 1.65* 
_cons -0.2152389 -3.39 0.0994006 0.72 
N 12,635 2,766 
***, ** and * represents significance at level of 1%, 5% and %10 respectively 
 
Similar situation happens to the total assets growth rate, only this time the degree of a positive 
effect from treatment variable HK is underestimated. In other words, HKEX listed Chinese companies 
are more likely to expand the size of their businesses. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The goal of our study is to analyze the difference between the performance of Chinese 
companies listed on more developed equity markets and that if they were listed on the A-share market. 
Theoretically, random effects on the same empirical data sample under contradictory conditions are 
impossible to observe in real life. This means empirical data from both conditions is needed, yet a 
direct analysis on the average results between the companies from different stock exchanges might be 
remarkably compromised by selection bias. Propensity Score Matching method, however, enables us 
to compare the observations under such contradictory conditions by matching up the units from two 
different sample groups according to their characteristics that we want to control.  
We choose Chinese companies from Hong Kong Stock Exchange as our treated sample pool 
due to the sufficient number samples and the desirable market characteristics. HKEX is widely agreed 
upon as one of the most well-developed equity markets in the world in terms of both regulations, 
transaction liquidity and size of capitalization. Yet what makes it even more ideal to our empirical 
analysis is the geographic and cultural advantages when linking it with SSE and SSZE. After 
controlling decisive variables such as company size, debt ratios and current ratios, we observe an 
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increase in assets growth rate but a decrease in the return on assets of HKEX listed companies. This 
confirms our first hypothesis that being listed on HKEX does make a difference on the performance 
than being listed as an A-share, which is consistent with past Chinese cross-listing studies. Companies 
tend to raise more money and become aggressive in expanding their business, but operating 
performance deteriorates due to heavier expenses for keeping high standards of corporate governance 
such as audit, as well as listing fees for the stock exchange. Moreover, we observe such pattern in a 
greater intensity in the state-owned companies: they appear to be even more aggressive in expanding 
their businesses but doing worse in terms of profiting. This phenomenon can be attributed to various 
subsidy and exemption programs imposed by the Chinese government, which evidently do not 
improve the profitability of the state-owned enterprises. We thus reject our second hypothesis 
regarding better improvement on companies with political backgrounds. Based on our empirical 
findings, we conclude a general negative effect on corporate performance for the Chinese enterprise 
if it be listed in a more developed economy instead of mainland China, and hereby recommend deeper 
considerations to potential overseas-listed Chinese enterprises.  
Further analysis, however, is encouraged to be implemented on the subject as it’s still a 
relatively new area yet to be extended. The extent to which the application of the results from the 
evidence we find on Hong Kong market on other developed equity markets remains unclear. Despite 
the similarity of Hong Kong market to the Western countries in terms of regulations and systems, it 
shares a lot of things in common, especially cultural, with mainland China that the Western countries 
such as the U.S. do not. We also want to keep a skeptical mind with the data for the A-share companies 
because of the potential corporate financial publication fraud, which is usually due to insufficient 
enforcement of regulations. On the other side, the high dynamic feature of Chinese market disrupts 
the constancy of our conclusion and it requires continual updates on the study of the subject in terms 
of corporate data. I would also suggest a difference-in-differences analysis on sample companies’ 
financial contents before and after the IPO issuance after the PSM process to get a better view. This is 
hard to practice for our data period as accurate information before listing has usually been unavailable 
for A-share companies. However, the implementation of the strategy would be feasible in the future 
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as the Chinese government has been continuously working towards a better market environment 
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Variable Full Name Definition / Assignment 
ROA ROA Net Income / Total Assets 
GROWTH Assets Growth Rate (Assets – Last Period Assets) / Last Period Assets 
HK Overseas-Listing Yes = 1; No = 0 
SIZE Size Natural Logarithm of Total Assets 
LEVER Debt Ratio Debts / Total Assets 
TOBINQ Tobin’s Q Market Value / Book Value  
TOP1 Top One Ownership The Proportion of the Biggest Shareholder’s Ownership 
LIQUID Current Ratio Current Assets / Current Debts 
EM Equity Multiplier Total Assets / Shareholder’s Equity 
PROFM Profit Margin Net Income / Revenue 
ASTURN Assets Turnover Revenue / ((Beginning Assets + Ending Assets) /2) 
TANG Fixed Assets Rate Net Fixed Assets / Total Assets 
year_2~4 Fiscal Years Dummy Variables for 4 Fiscal Years 
ind1~9 Industry Dummy Variables for 10 Sectors according to GICS 
 
33 







































Appendix E-1 Number of Successful Matchings – Nearest-Neighbor Matching 
 
 
Appendix E-2 Number of Successful Matchings – Kernel Matching 
 
